Ficino: Ficino

Dem. Opus habebam, o Socrates, quaedam privatim tecum communicare, siquidem otium sit, vel etiam negotium, modo non omnino magnum: velim enim mea causa otium agas. So. Equidem otiosus et alioqui sum, sed tui causa maxime.

Dem. I had need, O Socrates, to communicate certain things with you privately, if indeed you have leisure, or even if you have business, provided it is not altogether great: for I would like you, for my sake, to spend leisure. So. For my part I am at leisure otherwise as well, but most of all for your sake.

Si quid ergo dicere vis, licet. Dem. Vin secedamus hinc in proximam Iovis liberatoris porticum?

If therefore you wish to say anything, you may. Dem. Do you want us to withdraw from here to the nearest portico of Jupiter the Liberator?

So. Ut lubet. Dem. Eamus ergo, o Socrates.

So. As you please. Dem. Let us go then, O Socrates.

Omnes quidem plantae eodem se modo habere videntur et quae e terra nascuntur, animaliaque omnia et homines denique ipsi. Ut enim in plantis facillimum hoc nobis est qui terram colimus, praeparare quidem omnia antequam plantemus et ipsa etiam plantatio. Postquam vero quod plantatum est, vivit.

All plants indeed seem to be in the same condition—and the things that are born from the earth, and all animals, and finally human beings themselves. For in the case of plants, this is easiest for us who cultivate the earth: to prepare everything before we plant, and the planting itself as well. Afterward, what has been planted lives.

Tunc cultus ipsius varius est et difficilis, sic et in hominibus videtur. Ex meis enim rebus caetera coniicio. Etenim haec mihi mei filii sive plantatio, seu generatio appellanda sit, omnium facillima extitit, educatio autem difficilis et plena timoris semper, maximum metum ipsius causa subeunti, fuit.

Then its cultivation is various and difficult; so also it appears among human beings. For from my own affairs I conjecture the rest. Indeed this—whether it should be called the planting of my son or his generation—proved the easiest of all; but the upbringing, however, was difficult and always full of fear, I undergoing the greatest dread on his account.

Et alia quidem multa de hoc dici possent, praecipue vero cupiditas, quae huic nunc inest, vehementer me sollicitat. Est enim non ingenerosa, verum talis, ut fallere possit. Cupit enim, o Socrates, ut ipse ait, sapiens effici.

And indeed many other things could be said about this; but especially the desire which is now in him greatly disquiets me. For it is not ignoble, but such as could deceive. For he desires, O Socrates, as he himself says, to be made wise.

Et, ut mihi videtur, populares quidem eius ac aequales in urbem venientes sermones quosdam ei replentes hunc vehementer incitaverunt, quos aemulari coepit et mihi iam pridem molestus est, volens, ut eius curam suscipiam, ac pecuniam sophistae alicui, qui ipsum sapientem reddat, persolvam. Mihi vero pecuniarum minor est cura; verum hunc existimo ob hoc eius studium in periculum non mediocre incursurum. Hactenus igitur huic obstiti, consolando, sed ubi diutius nequeo, operae pretium fore duxi, ut ei obtemperem, ne sine me frequenter cum aliis vivens corrumpatur.

And, as it seems to me, his compatriots indeed and age-mates, coming into the city and filling him with certain discourses, have vehemently incited this one, which he began to emulate, and he has long been troublesome to me, wanting that I undertake his care, and that I pay money to some sophist who will render him wise. For my part the care of monies is less; but I think that on account of this zeal he will incur no mediocre peril. Thus far, therefore, I have stood against him, by consoling; but when I cannot any longer, I have judged it worth the effort to comply with him, lest, living frequently with others without me, he be corrupted.

Nuc autem ad hoc proficiscor, ut eum alicui eorum qui sophistae existimantur, commendem. Tu igitur peropportune nobis obviam factus es, quem quidem hac in re mihi consultorem maxime cupiebam. Itaque siquid habes, quod mihi in iis, quae audisti, consulere queas, licet et expedit.

Now, however, I am setting out for this purpose: to commend him to some one of those who are thought to be sophists. You, therefore, have met us most opportunely, you whom indeed in this matter I was especially desiring as a counselor for me. And so, if you have anything with which you can advise me in the matters you have heard, you are permitted—and it is expedient—to do so.

So. Ceterum, o Demodoce, vulgo dicitur, consilium res sacra est et si umquam ullum aliud, hoc est imprimis de quo quaeris. Non est enim divinius aliquid, quo de quis consulere queat, quam de institutione sui atque suorum. Primum igitur conveniamus, quidnam hoc esse putemus, quo de consultamus, ne saepenumero ego quidem aliud illud existimem, tu autem aliud, ac deinde longe dissentiamus; ridiculi quidem existimem ambo et qui do et qui tu qui postulas consilium, cum nihildum consenserimus.

So. Moreover, O Demodocus, it is commonly said, counsel is a sacred thing; and if ever any other is so, this one is especially, the very one about which you ask. For there is nothing more divine about which one can consult than the institution of oneself and one’s own. First, therefore, let us agree what we think this thing is about which we are consulting, lest I often suppose it to be one thing and you another, and then we differ widely; I would indeed deem ridiculous both of us—both I who give, and you who request, counsel—since we have as yet agreed on nothing.

Dem. Recte quidem mihi dicere videris, o Socrates. Itaque faciendum censeo.

Dem. You seem to me indeed to speak rightly, o Socrates. Therefore I judge it ought to be done.

So. Recte, inquam, non omnino tamen recte, nam paulisper id muto: dubito enim ne forte hic adolescentulus, alia quaedam, quam quae nos rebamur, cupiat; quod si alia, nos quoque absurdius faciamus de alio consultantes. Rectissimum igitur mihi videtur, ut initium hinc sumentes, ipsum quid maxime instituat, rogemus. Dem.

So. Right, I say, yet not altogether right; for I modify that a little: for I rather fear that perhaps this young man may desire certain other things than those we supposed; and if they are other things, we too would be acting more absurdly, consulting about something else. Therefore the straightest course seems to me, that, taking our beginning from here, we should ask him himself what he chiefly intends. Dem.

Optimum videtur ut dicis. So. Dic igitur mihi, quod pulchrum nomen est puero? Quo nomine ipsum vocabimus?

It seems best as you say. So. Tell me then, what fair name is for the boy? By what name shall we call him?

Dem. Theages, o Socrates. So. Pulchrum, o Demodoce, et divinum filio nomen imposuisti.

Dem. Theages, O Socrates. So. Beautiful, O Demodocus, and divine is the name you have imposed upon your son.

Sed tu dic mihi, Theages, cupisne sapiens esse? Ac dignum existimas esse, ut pater hic tuus virum inveniat, qui te sua consuetudine sapientem reddat? Theag.

But you, tell me, Theages, do you desire to be sapient? And do you deem it worthy that your father here should find a man who by his association will render you sapient? Theag.

Cupio. So. Sapientes autem utrum vocas homines scientiam habentes, quaecumque illa sint quae scierint, necne? Theag.

I desire it. So. But do you call wise men those who possess knowledge, whatever those things may be that they have known, or not? Theag.

Scientes equidem. So. Quid igitur, nonne te pater edocuit, quae hic nobilium virorum filii docentur? Scilicet litteras, citharam pulsare, palaestram et alia certamina?

Knowing, indeed. So. What then—did not your father instruct you in the things which the sons of noble men are taught here? Namely letters, to strike the cithara, the palaestra, and other contests?

Theag. Docuit. So. Putas praeterea te aliqua scientia indigere, de qua curam suscipere tui causa patrem deceat?

Theag. He taught. So. Do you suppose, besides, that you need any knowledge, on account of which it would be fitting for your father, for your sake, to undertake care?

Theag. Puto. So. Quae est igitur ipsa?

Theag. I think so. So. What, then, is it?

Dic nobis, ut tibi gratificemur. Theag. Novit et hic, o Socrates, quoniam persaepe illi narravi, sed de industria haec nunc tecum loquitur, quasi nesciat quae cupiam; hoc enim modo et in aliis multis mecum pugnat, neque vult alicui me tradere.

Tell us, so that we may gratify you. Theag. He too knows, O Socrates, since I have very often narrated it to him; but on purpose he now says these things with you, as if he did not know what I desire; for in this way also in many other matters he fights with me, and he is unwilling to hand me over to anyone.

So. Atqui quae hactenus adversus hunc abs te dicta sunt, testibus carent; nunc autem me adhibe testem, atque coram me denuo recense. Quaenam est haec sapientia, quam appetis? Age, si cuperes eam qua homines navigia gubernant et ego te rogarem, quanam, o Theages, sapientia indigens, patri succenses, quod te his, a quibus sapiens te reddi potes, non tradat, quamnam esse responderes?

So. But indeed the things that up to now have been said by you against this man lack witnesses; now, however, call me as a witness, and in my presence recount it anew. What is this wisdom that you seek? Come then, if you were desiring that by which men navigate ships and I were to ask you, in need of what wisdom, O Theages, are you indignant at your father because he does not hand you over to those by whom you can be rendered wise—what would you say that it is?

Nonne gubernatoriam? Theag. Certe.

Surely the helmsman’s? Theag. Certainly.

So. Sin autem illius cuperes eruditum te fieri, qua currus reguntur, ac patri succenseres, ego vero rogem, quaenam ea esset, nonne aurigariam respondeas? Theag. Utique.

So. But if, however, you wished to become erudite in that by which chariots are governed, and were indignant with your father, and I were to ask what that was, would you not answer “aurigation (charioteering)”? Theag. Of course.

So. Haec autem quam appetis utrum habet nomen, an non. Theag. Existimo habere.

So. But this thing you desire—does it have a name, or not? Theag. I think it has.

So. Utrum hic illam quidem nosti, nomen autem ignoras? Vel nomen etiam tenes? Theag.

So. Do you in this case know that thing itself, but are ignorant of the name? Or do you also hold the name? Theag.

Etiam nomen. So. Dic ergo quid est. Theag.

Yes, the name as well. So. Say then what it is. Theag.

Quod aliud nomen huic congruere, o Socrates, quam sapientiae? So. Nonne etiam aurigaria, sapientia est? An ignorantia tibi videtur?

What other name congrues to this, o Socrates, than wisdom? So. Is not even charioteering a wisdom? Or does it seem to you to be ignorance?

Theag. Nullo modo. So. An non sapientia?

Theag. By no means. So. Or is it not wisdom?

Theag. Sapientia. So. Qua ad quid utimur?

Theag. Wisdom. So. For what do we use it?

num qua scimus equorum iuga regere? Theag. Profecto.

Do we in any way know how to govern teams of horses? Theag. Indeed.

So. Num et ea est, qua naves gubernamus? Theag. Ea utique.

So. Is it also that by which we steer ships? Theag. That indeed.

So. Ea vero quam nunc optas, quaenam sapientia est, quidve eam adepti scimus gubernare? Theag. Mihi quidem videtur ea, qua scimus hominibus imperare.

So. And the one which you now desire—what wisdom is it, and, having acquired it, what do we know how to govern? Theag. To me indeed it seems to be that by which we know how to command men.

So. Num qua aegrotantibus? Theag. Minime.

So. Is it the one for the sick? Theag. Not at all.

So. Ipsa enim medicina est, nonne? Theag. Est.

So. For that is medicine itself, is it not? Theag. It is.

So. At qua canentibus scimus in choris praeesse? Theag. Nequaquam.

So. But by what [art] do we know to preside over choruses of those singing? Theag. By no means.

So. Musica enim est. Theag. Ita.

So. For it is music. Theag. Yes.

So. Sed utrum qua certantibus praeesse? Theag. Nequaquam.

So. But which (art) to preside over competitors? Theag. By no means.

So. Gymnastica enim est. Theag. Est.

So. For it is Gymnastics. Theag. It is.

So. Verum qua quid facientibus, conare exprimere sic, quemadmodum superiora ego. Theag. Mihi plane videtur ea, qua his qui sunt in civitate.

So. But as to “by what” and “for those doing what,” try to express it thus, just as I did the former points. Theag. It plainly seems to me to be that by which one is over those who are in the city.

So. Nonne in civitate aegroti etiam sunt? Theag. Sunt quidem, sed non istis solum dico, verum omnibus qui in civitate versantur.

So. Are there not also the sick in the city? Theag. There are indeed, but I do not speak of those only, rather of all who are engaged in the city.

So. Intelligo quam artem dicis. Videris enim non eam qua praeesse novimus metentibus, aut vindemiantibus, aut plantantibus, aut serentibus, aut triturantibus: ipsa enim per quam iis imperamus, agricultura est. Theag.

So. I understand what art you mean. For you seem to mean not that by which we know one to be set over the reapers, or the vintagers, or the planters, or the sowers, or the threshers; for the very art by which we command them is agriculture. Theag.

Est. So. Neque rursus qua vel secantibus, vel perforantibus, vel polientibus, vel torno aliquid facientibus: nam haec ad fabros pertinet. Theag.

Yes. So. Nor again that [art] which is for those cutting, perforating, polishing, or doing something with the lathe: for these things pertain to artificers. Theag.

Certe. So. Verum fortasse qua iis universis, et agricolis, et fabris, et artificibus omnibus, ac privatis cunctis mulieribusque et viris imperitamus, eam tu sapientiam dicis. Theag.

Certainly. So. But perhaps you mean the wisdom by which we command all of them—farmers, and craftsmen, and all artificers, and all private persons, women and men. Theag.

Istam ipsam, o Socrates, iampridem dicere volebam. So. Potes dicere, an Aegisthus qui Agamemnonem apud Argos interfecit, his omnibus imperavit, quos dixisti, artificibus, privatis viris, mulieribusque universis, an aliis quibusdam? Theag.

That very thing, O Socrates, I wanted to say long ago. So. Can you say whether Aegisthus, who killed Agamemnon at Argos, exercised command over all those you mentioned—the artificers, the private men, and all the women—or over some others? Theag.

Non aliis, sed iis omnibus. So. Quid autem Peleus Aeaci filius in Phthia, nonne iisdem dominatus est? Theag.

Not others, but all of them. So. But what of Peleus, son of Aeacus, in Phthia—did he not rule these same? Theag.

Eisdem. So. Periandrum vero Cypseli, nonne audivisti apud Corinthios imperasse? Theag.

The same. So. But Periander, son of Cypselus, have you not heard that he ruled among the Corinthians? Theag.

Equidem. So. Nonne eisdem in civitate sua dominatus est? Theag.

Indeed. So. Did he not dominate the same in his own city? Theag.

Certe. So. Quid vero Archelaum Perdiccae nuper in Macedonia imperantem, num iisdem existimas dominatum? Theag.

Certainly. So. But what of Archelaus, son of Perdiccas, recently ruling in Macedonia—do you think he exercised dominion over those same people? Theag.

Equidem. So. Hippiam autem Pisistrati in hac urbe dominantem, quibusnam prefuisse arbitraris? Nonne eisdem?

Indeed. So. And Hippias, son of Pisistratus, ruling in this city, whom do you think he had presided over? Was it not over the same people?

Theag. Quidni. So. Bacis vero, et Sibylla, et nostras Amphylitus, quonam pacto tibi cognominandi viderentur?

Theag. Why not. So. But Bacis, and the Sibyl, and our compatriot Amphylitus, in what way would they seem to you to be cognominated?

Theag. Non alio, quam vatum nomine. So. Recte dicis, eodem modo conare, ut invenias quo cognomine Hippiam et Periandrum propter eundem principatum nomines.

Theag. By no other than by the name of seers. So. You speak rightly; in the same way try to find by what cognomen you would name Hippias and Periander on account of the same principate.

Theag. Qui vocem, quam tyrannos? So. Ergo quicunque cupit more istorum universis suis civibus imperare, tyrannidem appetit, et esse tyrannus studet?

Theag. What shall I call them, if not tyrants? So. Therefore, whoever desires, in the manner of those men, to command all his fellow-citizens, seeks tyranny and strives to be a tyrant?

Theag. Ita videtur. So. Hanc tu optas?

Theag. So it seems. So. Do you opt for this?

Theag. Videtur ex iis quae dixi. So. Sceleste, more tyranni nobis praeesse cupis?

Theag. It appears from what I have said. So. Wretch, do you wish to rule over us, in the manner of a tyrant?

Ac iamdudum succenses patri, qui te ad aliquem tyrannidis praeceptorem non mittit? Et te Demodoce non pudet, qui cum dudum noris quid hic concupiscat, et quia quo ipsum mittas habes, artificem sapientiae illius, quam petit, facere potueris, invides, et nolis mittere? sed nunc vides.

And have you long been incensed at your father, because he does not send you to some preceptor of tyranny? And are you not ashamed, Demodocus, who, since you have long known what this man covets, and since you have one to whom you may send him, you could have made him an artificer of that wisdom which he seeks—do you envy and refuse to send? But now you see.

Cum vero te coram accusaverit, consultemus simul ego et tu, estne quo mittamus, ut alicuius consuetudine sapiens tyrannus efficiatur? Dem. Per Iovem, o Socrates, consultemus.

But when he has accused you face-to-face, let us consult together, I and you, whether there is anywhere we may send him, so that by the consuetude of someone a wise tyrant may be effected. Dem. By Jove, O Socrates, let us consult.

Est enim, ut mihi videtur, consilio opus, et maximo. So. Sine, bone vir, interrogemus ipsum prius. Dem.

For, as it seems to me, there is need of counsel, and of the greatest. So. Allow, good man, let us question him first. Dem.

Interroga. So. Quid si Euripide ad aliquid utamur, o Theages? Inquit enim ille,

Ask. So. What if we should make use of Euripides for something, o Theages? For he says,

Si quis Euripidem roget, o Euripides qua in re sapientum consuetudine ais sapere tyrannos? quemadmodum si cum dixisset, sapientes agricolae sunt sapientum consuetudine, percontaremur, quanam in re sapientum, quid putas ipsum dicturum? an aliud, quam in re rustica?

If someone should ask Euripides, O Euripides, in what matter, by the custom of the wise, do you say that tyrants are wise? just as, if, after he had said, farmers are wise by the custom of the wise, we would inquire, in what matter of the wise, what do you think he would say? anything other than, in rustic matters?

Theag. Nihil aliud. So. Eodem modo si dixisset, sapientes coci sapientum consuetudine, nosque rogaremus, quanam in re sapientum, quid aliud responderet, quam coquinaria?

Theag. Nothing else. So. In the same way, if he had said, wise cooks by the consuetude of the wise, and we were to ask, in what matter of the wise, what else would he answer than cookery?

Theag. Idipsum. So. Quid si dixisset, sapientes athletae sapientum consuetudine, et nos in quo sapientum interrogemus, nonne certando responderet?

Theag. The very same. So. What if he had said, “athletes are wise by the custom of the wise,” and we were to ask in what respect of the wise, would he not answer: “in competing”?

Theag. Immo. So. Et quia dixit, Sapientes tyranni sapientum consuetudine, si rogaremus illum, qua in re, o Euripides sapientum, quid eum responsurum putas?

Theag. Rather. So. And since he said, “Wise tyrants by the custom of the wise,” if we asked him, “in what matter, O Euripides, of the wise,” what do you think he would respond?

Theag. Per Iovem nescio. So. Vis tibi dicam?

Theag. By Jupiter, I do not know. So. Do you want me to tell you?

Theag. Ut lubet. So. Haec sunt quae ait Anacreo ipsam Calicretem nosse.

Theag. As you please. So. These are the things which he says to Anacreon that Callicrete herself knows.

Audisti carmen? Theag. Audivi.

Have you heard the song? Theag. I have heard.

So. Quid igitur, huiusmodine viri consuetudinem cupis, qui eam artem teneat, quam tenebat Callicretes Cyane nata, quique sciret tyrannica quae Callicretem novisse po‘ta inquit, ut et in nos et civitatem tyrannidem exerceas? Theag. Iamdudum me mordes Socrates, atque irrides.

So. What then? Do you desire the association of a man of this sort, who possesses that art which Callicrete, daughter of Cyane, possessed, and who would know the tyrannical things which the poet says Callicretes knew, so that you may exercise tyranny both over us and over the city? Theag. You have been biting me for some time, Socrates, and you deride me.

So. Quamobrem? nonne ais hanc te sapientiam optare, qua cunctis imperes? Atqui haec faciens aliudne, quam tyrannus sit?

So. Why then? Do you not say that you desire this wisdom, by which you may command all? And yet, in doing this, would you be anything other than a tyrant?

Theag. Optarem quidem, ut arbitror, vel omnium hominum, vel quam plurimorum tyrannide potiri, quo idem de te ac caeteris omnibus persuadeo mihi, aut etiam Deus esse. Veruntamen non hoc appetere dicebam.

Theag. I would indeed wish, as I suppose, to obtain tyranny over either all men or as many as possible; in which I persuade myself the same about you and about all the rest, or even to be God. Nevertheless, I was not saying that I desire this.

So. Quid tandem est hoc quod cupis? nonne civibus praeesse? Theag.

So. What, then, is this that you desire? Is it not to preside over the citizens? Theag.

Non vi quidem, neque ut tyranni: sed volentibus, quemadmodum alii in civitate bene morati ac boni viri. So. Dicis ergo qualis Themistocles fuit, et Pericles, et Cimo, et quicunque alii in adminstratione reipublicae floruerunt? Theag.

Not by force indeed, nor as tyrants: but with the willing, just as others in the city, men of good morals and good men. So. You say then such as Themistocles was, and Pericles, and Cimon, and whoever else flourished in the administration of the republic? Theag.

Per Iovem istos inquam. So. Quid vero si nobiles eques esse studeas, et in ea arte sapiens, ad quosnam alios accederes, quam ad equites? Theag.

By Jove, those, I say. So. But what if you were to strive to be a noble equestrian, and wise in that art—whom else would you approach than the equestrians? Theag.

Ad nullos alios. So. Quippe ad hos ipsos qui equestri arte pollent, et qui equis tum nostratibus, tum alienis quam plurimis utuntur. Theag.

To no others. So. Surely to these very men who excel in the equestrian art, and who use as many horses as possible, both native and foreign. Theag.

Scilicet. So. Eodemque modo si sapienter iaculandi artem adipisci cupias, ad eos qui optime iaculantur, et qui multis tam alienis, quam propris utuntur spiculis, proficiscereris. Theag.

Of course. So. And in the same way, if you should desire to acquire wisely the art of javelin-throwing, you would set out to those who throw best, and who use very many darts, both others’ and their own. Theag.

Mihi quidem videtur. So. Age itaque postquam in civilibus erudiri vis, ut in iis sapiens fias, ad alios accedendum putas, quam ad hos civiles homines, qui disciplina civili summopere valent, et utuntur tum patria, tum aliis civitatibus: versanturque ob id in Graecis et in barbaris. An putas cum aliis quibusdam conversans, sapiens evadere in iis quibus ipsi sunt: et non in his ipsis.

It seems so to me indeed. So. Come then, since you wish to be erudite in civil matters, so that you may become wise in them, do you think one should resort to others rather than to these civil men, who are exceedingly strong in the civil discipline, and make use both of their native country and of other commonwealths: and on that account are conversant among Greeks and barbarians? Or do you think, by conversing with certain others, to turn out wise in those things in which they themselves are, and not with these very men.

Theag. Audivi Socrates, sermones quosdam, quos tuos asserunt, civilium virorum liberos nihilo meliores, quam cerdonum esse. Et mea quidem sententia vera dicis.

Theag. I have heard, Socrates, certain discourses, which they assert to be yours, that the children of civic men are no whit better than those of cobblers. And in my own opinion indeed you speak true.

Insipiens ergo sim ego, qui de illorum numero esse possum, si mihi persuadeam, aliquem istorum suam mihi sapientiam traditurum, qui quidem suos filios ipsorum minime iuvent, putemque vel mihi, vel ulli mortalium ad hanc rem posse prodesse. So. Quid tu igitur optime hominum agas, si cum tibi filius esset, huiusmodi negotia exhiberet, ostendens cupere in optimum pictorem evadere, succenseatque tibi quod nullam in se pecuniam eius gratia collocares, sed ipsos pingendi artifices parvi penderet, neque ab eis aliquid vellet discere, tibicines item, tibicen effici volens, vel etiam citharoedos. Habes quod cum eo agas, vel quo tandem illum mitteres, nolentem ab iis discere?

Foolish then should I be, I who might be of their number, if I persuade myself that any of those would hand over his own wisdom to me—who indeed help their own sons least—and think that either to me or to any of mortals they could be able to profit in this matter. So. What then, best of men, would you do, if, when you had a son, he should put forward such proposals, showing that he desires to become an excellent painter, and should be angry with you because you would invest no money in him for that purpose, but he himself holds the very artificers of painting in slight regard, nor would he wish to learn anything from them—likewise the tibicines, while wishing to become a tibicen, or even the citharodes? Have you something to do with him, or where at last would you send him, unwilling to learn from them?

Theag. Minime profecto habeo. So. Nonne igitur eadem haec faciens, miraris atque succenses patri, cum dubitat quid tecum agat, et quo te mittat, quem Atheniensium in administranda republica praestantissimorum cuicunque voluisses commendaturi eramus, qui tecum sine pretio versatus fuisset: simulque et sumptibus pepercisses, et ab huiusmodi consuetudine plus nominis quaesivisses, quam omnium caeterorum.

Theag. By no means, indeed, do I have it. So. Do you not then, doing these same things, marvel and grow indignant at your father, when he hesitates what he should do with you and where he should send you—we were going to commend you to whichever of the most outstanding of the Athenians in administering the commonwealth you wished, who would have associated with you without a fee: and at the same time you would have spared expenses, and from such a consuetude you would have acquired more name, that is, reputation, than from all the rest.

Theag. Quid igitur Socrates, nonne tu ex bonis viris es? Si me susceperis, sat habeo, neque alium quaero. So. Quid hoc dicis?

Theag. What then, Socrates, are you not among the good men? If you take me on, I have enough, nor do I seek another. So. What do you mean by this?

Dem. Non male dicit, o Socrates, neque mihi quicquam hoc iucundius utiliusque, ut arbitror, esse posset, quam si huic tua consuetudo placeat, et si tu cum eo versari velis: et profecto pudore impedior dicere, quam vehementer affectem. Itaque ambos vos rogatos velim, et te ut velis hunc suscipere, et te ne alium, quam Socratem quaeras, meque maximis curis, et formidine plenis obsecro liberetis, quoniam nunc vehementer timeo, ne hic cuiuspiam alterius consuetudinem quaerat a quo deinde perdatur.

Dem. He speaks not badly, O Socrates, nor could anything, as I judge, be more pleasant and more useful to me than if your consuetude should please him, and if you should be willing to associate with him: and indeed I am hindered by modesty from saying how vehemently I desire it. Therefore I would have you both entreated, both you to be willing to take him up, and you to seek no other than Socrates, and that you would free me, full of the greatest cares and dread, I beg you, since now I greatly fear lest he seek the consuetude of some other person, by whom thereafter he may be ruined.

Theag. Ne ulterius mihi timeas, mi pater, si huic persuadere potes, ut me suscipiat. Dem.

Theag. Do not fear further for me, my father, if you can persuade this man to receive me. Dem.

Recte loqueris, et ad te, o Socrates, omnis posthac oratio convertetur. Ego enim ut brevissime loquar, me simul ac mea omnia vel charissima quocunque indigeas tibi libentissime trado, si hunc Theagem susceperis, eique pro virili tua bene feceris. So. Equidem, o Demodoce, studium hoc tuum non admirer, siquidem existimas maxime a me hunc iuvari posse.

You speak rightly, and to you, O Socrates, all discourse hereafter will be turned. For, to speak most briefly, I most gladly hand over myself together with all my possessions, even the dearest, to you wherever you have need, if you will take on this Theages and do him good to the best of your ability. So. Indeed, O Demodocus, I do not marvel at this zeal of yours, since you suppose that he can be most helped by me.

Non enim video ubi maiore diligentia opus sit, si quis mentem modo habet, quam ut filium optimum reddat. Sed unde tibi hoc visum est, me videlicet tuum filium meliorem posse civem reddere, quam tute possis? Atque unde hic sibi persuasit posse magis a me, quam abs te ad hanc rem iuvari?

For I do not see where greater diligence is needed, if one only has a mind, than that he render his son a most excellent son. But whence did this seem to you—namely, that I can render your son a better citizen than you yourself can? And whence has he persuaded himself that he can be more aided by me than by you for this matter?

Id enim vehementer admiror: tu enim primum me senior es, deinde multis ac maxima apud Athenienses functus es magistratibus, neque te magis quisquam a popularibs Anagyrusiis ac reliquis civibus honoratur. In me autem horum quicquam neuter vestrum videt. Verum si civilium virorum consuetudines Theages iste contemnit, aliosque quaerit qui instruere iuventam profitentur, est hic Prodicus Chius, et Gorgias Leontinus, et Polus Agrigentinus, aliique permulti, qui adeo sapientes sunt, ut cum urbes adeunt, nobilissimos et ditissimos alliciant ad se iuvenes: quibus cum vel optimorum quoruncunque familiaritate gratis uti liceret, eorum assuetudine relicta, persuasi ad illos conferunt se, pretium, atque id ingens, offerentes ultra, et gratiam insuper maximas habentes.

For this I marvel greatly: for you, first, are my senior, then you have discharged many and the greatest magistracies among the Athenians, nor is anyone more honored than you by your fellow-demesmen of Anagyrous and by the other citizens. But in me neither of you sees any of these things. Yet if this Theages scorns the associations of civil men, and seeks others who profess to instruct the youth, there is here Prodicus the Chian, and Gorgias the Leontine, and Polus the Agrigentine, and very many others, who are so wise that, when they come to cities, they allure to themselves the noblest and richest youths; who, although they could make free use of the familiarity of any among the best men, with their accustomed association left behind, being persuaded, transfer themselves to those men, offering a fee—and that huge—into the bargain, and moreover rendering the greatest thanks.

Ex his ergo decebat te ac filium tuum aliquem eligere, me vero ad id elegisse non convenit. Nullam enim ex istis beatis et pulchris disciplinis, scio ac dico (et ut paucis loquar) velim tamen mihi illas esse notas. Verum semper nihil scire, praeter exiguam quandam amandi disciplinam, qua vulgo praestantior, tum superioribus, tum etiam praesentibus viris esse videor.

From these, then, it was fitting that you and your son choose someone; but that I should have chosen for that is not suitable. For none of those blessed and beautiful disciplines do I know—and I say (and to speak in few words)—I would, however, wish those to be known to me. But I always know nothing, except a certain slight discipline of loving, in which I seem, in common estimation, to be more preeminent than men both of earlier times and also of the present.

Theag. Videsne pater Socratem hunc non admodum familiaritatem meam recipere? Nam quod ad me attinet, paratus eram, modo ipse voluisset: sed haec omnia ille ioco adversus nos dicit.

Theag. Do you see, father, that this Socrates does not particularly receive my familiarity? For as it pertains to me, I was prepared, provided only that he himself had been willing; but he says all these things in jest against us.

Novi enim meorum aequalium, et aliquando seniorum nonnullos, qui priusquam cum hoc versarentur, nullius erant pretii: postquam autem familiaritate istius usi sunt, brevi omnium supremi eorum evaserunt, quorum infimi prius erant. So. Nosti quale hoc fit, o Demodoci fili? Theag.

For I know some of my equals, and sometimes of my seniors, who, before they consorted with this man, were of no worth; but after they made use of the familiarity of that one, in a short time they emerged as the highest of all those among whom they had formerly been the lowest. So. Do you know how this comes about, O son of Demodocus? Theag.

Novi per Iovem: si voles enim, talis fiam, quales illi fuerunt. So. Non ita, o optime, sed hoc te fefellit, quale sit: ergo autem tibi dicam. Adest mihi divina quadam sorte daemonium quoddam a prima pueritia me secutum: hoc enim vox est quaedam, quae cum fit, semper eius rei, quam facturus sum, dissuasionem innuit, provocat vero nunquam.

I know, by Jove: for if you wish, I shall become such as those men were. So. Not so, O best man, but this has deceived you, what sort it is; well then, I will tell you. There is present to me, by a certain divine lot, a certain daimonion that has followed me from my earliest boyhood: for this is a certain voice which, whenever it occurs, always intimates dissuasion regarding the thing I am about to do, but it never provokes.

Quod si quis amicorum mecum quandoque aliquid communicat, venitque vox, hoc illa dissuadet, neque facere sinit. Cuius quidem rei vobis testes dabo. Charmidem virum bonum Glauconis filium noscitis.

But if any of my friends at any time communicates something with me, and the voice comes, this it dissuades, nor does it permit me to do it. Of this matter indeed I will give you witnesses. You know Charmides, a good man, the son of Glaucon.

hic aliquando in Nemea stadio se exercitaturus mecum communicabat. Ac statim ubi dicere inciperet quod se exercitaturus esset, affuit vox: ego prohibui, edicens quemadmodum ipso loquente daemonii vox extiterat, ne se exerceret. Ille vero, fortasse, inquit, significat tibi me victorem non evasurum sed et si victoria non potiar, tamen hoc tempore me exercens, aliquid proficiam.

this man once at Nemea, about to exercise in the stadium, was communicating with me. And immediately, as soon as he began to say that he was going to exercise, the voice was present; I prohibited it, declaring how, while he himself was speaking, the voice of the daemon had appeared, that he should not exercise. He, however, said, “perhaps it signifies to you that I shall not come out a victor; but even if I do not obtain victory, nevertheless by exercising at this time I shall make some progress.”

Atque ita locutus, in certamen abit. Operae pretium igitur est audire ab eo quid ei ex eo certamine contigerit. Iam si vultis et Clitomachum Timarchi fratrem rogate quid ei Timarchus dixerit, cum iam moriturus esset: is enim et Euathlus quidam cursor, qui illum fugientem suscepit, referet vobis quid ille tunc dixerit.

And so having spoken thus, he goes into the contest. It is therefore worth the effort to hear from him what befell him from that contest. Now if you wish, ask Clitomachus, the brother of Timarchus, what Timarchus said to him when he was now about to die: for he, and a certain runner Euathlus, who caught him as he was fleeing, will report to you what he said then.

Theag. Quidnam? So. O Clitomache, inquit, equidem quam primum moriturus venio, quoniam Socrati obtemperare nolui.

Theag. What? So. “O Clitomachus,” he said, “indeed I am coming to die very soon, since I was unwilling to obey Socrates.”

Hoc quid ita dixerit Timarchus, ego exponam. Cum enim surrexissent ex convivio Timrachus, et Philemon Philemonidis filius, interfecturi Niciam Hiroscamandri filium, soli enim infediarum ii conscii fuerant: hic Timarchus, Quid ais, o Socrates, inquit. Vos quidem bibite, me vero oportet alio ire, redibo autem paulo post, si occasio erit.

Why Timarchus said this, I shall expound. For when they had risen from the banquet, Timarchus and Philemon, son of Philemonides, intending to slay Nicias, son of Hiroscamander—for they alone had been privy to the plot—this Timarchus said: What say you, O Socrates? You indeed drink; but it is necessary for me to go elsewhere; I will return a little later, if there is an occasion.

Tum mihi aderat vox: Itaque ne surgas inquam: solitum enim mihi a daemone signum factum est. Quievit ille. Deinde paulisper commoratus, ardebat iterum eundi cupiditate, dicens, Eo iam Socrates.

Then a voice was present to me: “Therefore do not rise,” I say; “for the accustomed sign from my daemon has been made for me.” He grew quiet. Then, after lingering a little while, he was burning again with the desire of going, saying, “I go now, Socrates.”

Et quia iterum vocem audivi, rursus illum cohibui, donec ille tertio latere me cupiens, surrexit, nihil mihi dicens, sed observans, cum ego mentem alio advertissem: et sic profectus ea patravit, quae mortis ei causa fuerant. Haec eadem ille fratri, quemadmodum nunc ego vobis, dixit, se scilicet moriturum venire, quod mihi credere noluisset. Audietis praeterea ex multis qui in Sicilia sunt, quae de exercitus clade praedixeram.

And because I heard the voice again, I once more restrained him, until he, desiring for the third time to escape my notice, rose up, saying nothing to me, but observing when I had turned my mind elsewhere: and thus, having set out, he perpetrated those things which had been the cause of death to him. He told these same things to his brother, just as I now to you, namely that he was coming to his death, because he had been unwilling to believe me. You will hear besides from many who are in Sicily what I had predicted about the army’s disaster.

Et praeterita quidem ab his qui illa noverunt, audire licet. Experiri vero daemonii signum siquid forte dicat, etiam nunc possumus. In expeditionem namque exiit Sannionis Cali filius.

And the things past indeed it is permitted to hear from those who knew them. Moreover, we can even now put to the test the daemon’s sign, if perchance it says anything. For on an expedition has gone out the son of Calus of Sannio.

Mihi autem signum adfuit. proficiscitur vero nunc cum Thrasylo adversus Ephesum et Ioniam militaturus. Ego autem illum existimo, vel interfectum iri, vel huiusmodi aliquid incursurum, et de reliquo negotio vehementer metuo.

To me, however, a sign was present. he is in fact now setting out with Thrasyllus to wage war against Ephesus and Ionia. But I judge that he will either be killed, or will incur something of this kind; and about the remaining business I fear vehemently.

Haec omnia ideo tibi dico, quia potestas omnis ad familiaritates cum his, qui mecum sunt, instituendas penes daemonium est. Multis enim adversatur, neque licet his auxilium ferre, qui mecum invito daemone conversantur: quare impossibile est mihi, cum his vivere. Multis autem haerere non prohibet, sed consuetudine nostra nihil omnino iuvantur.

All these things for this reason I tell you, because all power for establishing familiarities with those who are with me is in the hands of the daemon. For he opposes many, nor is it permitted to bring aid to those who consort with me the daemon being unwilling; wherefore it is impossible for me to live with them. But he does not forbid many to cling; yet by our association they are in no way helped at all.

Quibus autem faverit in ipsa familiaritate potestas daemonii, illi sunt de quibus illud animadvertisti. brevi enim proficiunt. Sed eorum partim hoc beneficium firmum habent atque durabile, plerique vero quoad mecum sunt, mirifice pollent: at ubi discesserint, rursus nihil a caeteris differunt.

Those, however, whom the power of the daemon has favored within the very familiarity, are the ones about whom you made that observation. For they make progress in a short time. But some of them hold this benefit firm and durable, while most indeed, so long as they are with me, are marvelously powerful; but when they have departed, again they differ in nothing from the rest.

Hoc quandoque accidit Aristidi Lysimachi filio, eius qui filius fuit Aristidis. Nam mecum commorans, brevi multum profecit: postea vero in militiam profectus est: rediens deinde offendit apud me agentem Thucydidem Melissi filium: hic autem Thucydides pridie mihi inter disputandum nescio qua de re obiecerat. Cum me salutasset, et quaedam insuper collocutus esset Aristides, Thucydidem, inquit, o Socrates, audio gloriari, et in quibusdam tecum etiam concertare tanquam aliquid fit.

This once happened to Aristides, son of Lysimachus, he who was the son of Aristides. For while dwelling with me, in a short time he advanced much; but afterwards he set out for military service. Then on returning, he found with me Thucydides, son of Melissus, passing time; this Thucydides, however, on the previous day had objected to me while disputing about I know not what matter. When he had greeted me, and in addition had conversed about certain things, Aristides said, “O Socrates, I hear that Thucydides glories, and in certain matters even contends with you, as though he were something.”

Est inquam, ut dicis. Tum ille, non meminit, inquit, antequam tibi adhaereret, quale fuerit mancipium? Non videtur, inquam per deos.

It is, I say, as you say. Then he, does he not remember, said he, what sort of chattel-slave he had been before he adhered to you? It seems not, I say, by the gods.

At ego, inquit ille, ridiculus sum. Quidnam maxime inquam? Quoniam priusquam hinc abirem, cum quovis disputare audebam, neque aliquo videbat in disserendo deterior, adeo ut coetus praestantium virorum audacter adirem.

“But I,” said he, “am ridiculous.” “What, most of all?” said I. “Because before I departed from here, I used to dare to dispute with anyone whatsoever, nor did I seem to anyone inferior in discoursing, to such a degree that I would boldly approach assemblies of preeminent men.”

Nunc autem contra, fugio quemcumque eruditum esse intellexi, adeo pudore adducor ob inscitiam. Utrum igitur inquam e vestigio te relinquit illa vis, an paulatim? Paulatim, inquit.

Now, however, on the contrary, I flee whoever I have understood to be erudite, so far am I brought by shame on account of ignorance. “So then,” I said, “does that force leave you on the spot, or gradually?” “Gradually,” he said.

Quando vero in te incessit, utrum accidit tibi aliquid a me discenti, an aliter? Dicam, o Socrates, rem quidem per deos incredibilem, veram tamen. Nihil unquam a te, ut ipse scis, didici.

But when did it assail you—did something befall you while learning from me, or otherwise? I will say, O Socrates, a matter indeed, by the gods, incredible, yet true. I have never learned anything from you, as you yourself know.

proficiebam autem quotiescunque tecum essem, et si in eadem solum domo essem, non tamen in eadem parte domus, magis tamen quoties eadem in parte. Et mihi quidem videbar multo magis, quando in eadem parte existens, aliquid te dicentem intuebar, quam cum alio essem aversus. Sed longe magis proficiebam, cum apud te sedens, te tangebam.

I was making progress, however, whenever I was with you; and if I were only in the same house, yet not in the same part of the house, still more whenever in the same part. And indeed I seemed to myself much more so, when, existing in the same part, I gazed at you as you were saying something, than when I was turned away with another. But I advanced far more when, sitting beside you, I touched you.

Nunc autem omnis habitus ille defluxit. Est igitur, o Theages, huiusmodi nostra consuetudo. Si enim Deo gratum est, permultum quidem et brevi proficies: sin contra, minime.

Now, however, all that condition has ebbed away. Therefore, O Theages, our custom is of this sort. For if it is pleasing to God, you will indeed make very much progress, and in a short time; but if contrariwise, not at all.

Vide igitur ne tibi tutius sit ab aliquo illorum erudiri, quibus in sua potestate sita est utilitas qua caeteris prosunt, quam a me fortuna quadam id assequi. Theag. Mihi quidem sit faciendum, Socrates, videtur, ut consuetudine nostra de daemonio intelligamus.

See therefore whether it is safer for you to be educated by one of those in whom the usefulness by which they benefit others is set in their own power, than to obtain that from me by some fortune. Theag. It does indeed seem to me, Socrates, that this is what should be done—that, according to our custom, we understand about the daimonion.

Quod si nobis annuerit, recte omnia: sin minus, quid agendum sit consultabimus tum, alterine cuipiam adhaereamus, an hoc divinum quod tibi insitum est, precibus et sacrificiis et alio quovis denique pacto, quo vates iubent, placare conemur. Dem. Nihil ad haec, o Socrates, huic adolescenti repugnes, bene enim dicit Theages.

If it shall assent to us, all will be right; but if not, then we will consult what must be done—whether we should adhere to some other person, or try to placate this divine thing which is implanted in you by prayers and sacrifices and, finally, by any other mode whatsoever, as the vates bid. Dem. Do not at all, O Socrates, resist this adolescent in these matters; for Theages speaks well.

So. Atqui si videtur oportere sic agere, sic agamus.

So. But if it seems proper to act thus, let us act thus.